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RECENT CASES
NEGLIGENCE - DAMAGES - FEAR FOR THIRD PERSON'S
SAFETY - Plaintiff claimed damages for physical injuries
caused by fright or nervous shock when she observed the
defendant's truck negligently run over her child. The trial
court dismissed the action. The District Court of Appeal
ruled that the mother could recover.' The Supreme Court
of California in vacating the District Court decision held,
,three Justices dissenting, that liability could not be predicated
on fright or nervous shock with consequent bodily illness
induced solely by fear for the safety of a third person.
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33,
379 P.2d 513. (1963).
Alabama 2 and Texas 3 have permitted recovery for
mental pain and suffering although the plaintiff was in no
danger. A few jurisdictions have allowed recovery where
such fear caused actual physical injury.4  Recovery has
also been allowed for parents' mental anguish when their
child ate poison.5  Courts have granted recovery when the
act against the third person has been intentional 6 or
wanton.7
Some courts have allowed recovery when one fears for
another's safety if the plaintiff was himself endangered; 8
without this element, policy reasons have barred recovery.9
The leading case denying recovery when one does not
fear for his own safety but for the safety of a third person
1. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1962).
2. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912).
3. Gulf, C & S. F. Ry. Co v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App.
1906).
4. Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938); Cohn v.
Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914). (Plaintiff's
small children entered elevator and started it upward after the operator
had negligently left his controls. Fear for children cause mother to faint
and fall into elevator shaft).
5. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. 1962).
6. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890). (Plaintiff suffered
miscarriage after seeing defendant's battery upon two men).
7. Missouri K. & T. Ry Co. of Texas v. Hawkins, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 128,
109 S.W. 221 (1908). (Emotional distress caused by defendant's negligent
mutilation of corpse).
8. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Frazee v.
Western Dairy Prods., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
9. Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397
(1956).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
is Waube v. Warrington.0 This holding is accepted by most
jurisdictions, including California." New Hampshire recent-
ly rejected the intermediate court's holding in the instant
case 12 by declaring the defendant owed no duty to a third
person.1
3
For many years the leading case of Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry. Co.1 4 was not only authority for denying recovery for
injuries sustained in fearing for a third person's safety, but
also for any mental suffering without physical contact. The
concept fostered in the Mitchell case became known as the
"impact rule". 5 A recent decision has discarded the impact
rule and has deemed it obsolete.1
6
The principal case held that the impact rule did not
prevail in California, 17 basing this comment on an early
decision.' Fright has long been considered an element of
damage in California. 9
North Dakota by implication, appears to abide by the
impact rule. 20  If impact is required, certainly no recovery
would be upheld in North Dakota for an injury sustained
through fear for a third person's safety.
However, it is submitted that the "impact rule" is too
harsh. The principal case represents the soundest view by
allowing recovery for fright or shock when the claimant him-
self is injured while fearing for his own safety.
10. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). (The court held there was no
duty to a third person).
11. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (Ark. D.C.
1959); E.g., Reed v Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957); Strazza
v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Mahaffey v. Official
Detective Stories Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251 ('.D. La. 1962).
12. Supra note 1.
13. Barber v. Pollock, 187 A.2d 788 (N.M. 1963). (A wife saw her husband
involved in accident with the negligent defendant and later suffered a
mental breakdown when told he died).
14. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
15. Id. at 355 ". . . no recovery can be had for injuries sustained by
fright occasioned by the negligence of another, where there is no immediate
personal injury."
16. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
17. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35, 379
P.2d 513, 515 (1963).
18. Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896).
... if the primal cause of this injury is tortious, it is immaterial whether it
is direct, as by a blow, or indirect, through some action upon the mind."
19. Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 Pac.
597 (1916).
20. Wilson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 30 N.D. 456, 153 N.W. 429 (1915).
(Held that injury was not caused by fear of fire but from fighting same).
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Allowing recovery in circumstances analogous to the
instant case would extend potential recovery out of logical
proportion. Eventually such a rule would extend to mere
bystanders.
LYNN GARRET-I
HOMICIDE - FELONY - MURDER RULE - CO-FELON
KILLED BY ROBBERY VICTIM-The defendants (Austin and
Bell) and the deceased, Rowe, agreed to commit an armed
robbery. During the attempted perpetration of the crime,
the intended robbery victim shot and killed Rowe. The
defendants were charged with first degree murder but were
granted a motion to quash the information on the theory
that Rowe's death was a justifiable homicide, and therefore
no murder was committed. The Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court in a 5-2 decision. People v. Austin,
370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963).
At Common Law to be convicted of murder the killing
had to fall into one of two categories: (1) an unlawful
killing of another with malice aforethought, express or
implied;' or (2) a killing which falls within the terms of
the felony-murder rule.2  The basis of this rule is that in
the commission of a dangerous felony the perpetrator should
foresee a possible death since he invites dangerous re-
sistance. 3
The vast majority of jurisdictions have adopted some
statutory form of the common law felony-murder rule.
4
The Michigan statute5 is similar to other states. Generally
1. Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 76 A.2d 394 (1950); 4 BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES 195 (Lewis' ed. 1897).
2. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 36 (1957). The felony-murder rule
is stated as follows: "Homicide is murder if the death ensues in conse-
quence of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of some other felony
unless such other felony was not dangerous of itself and the method of
it perpetration or attempt did not appear to involve any appreciable hu-
man risk."
3. See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947)
(dictum).
4. See Arent and MacDonald, The Felony-Murder Doctrine And Its AP-
plication Under The New York Statutes, 20 Cornell L. Q. 288, 294 (1934-35)
for a complete survey of state statutes.
5. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316 (1948). "All murder . . . which shall be
committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery or burglary, shall be murder of the first degree; . . .
